INTRODUCTION
It is widely acknowledged that the sovereignty of the nation-state has been eroded.
Commentators have focussed on globalisation and internationalisation as indicative of shifts in supra-national governance, while others have emphasised the importance of sub-national actors and the rise of the 'region state' (OHMAE 1993) . Attention has been drawn to changing notions of governance in terms of the involvement of non-state actors, as much as the reallocation of decisional responsibilities between tiers of government. Multi-level governance rejects an either/or approach and focuses on the subtle processes through which supra-national and sub-national governmental and non-governmental agencies are encroaching on traditionally centralised policy areas (MARKS 1993 . BACHE AND FLINDERS 2004 ).
The case of science policy offers a fertile arena for examination of multi-level governance dynamics. Within Europe, for instance, the European Research Area (ERA)
initiative or the development of a European Research Council (ERC) indicate a strengthening supra-national tier of governance. This has been accompanied by the emergence of regional science policies as elected regional governments, development agencies and city partners attach increasing importance to science as a tool in economic growth. The distinction between science policy and innovation policy is important here. Whilst regional authorities have long engaged in innovation activities, particularly those aimed at SMEs (CHABBAL 1995), regional policy makers have shown reluctance to fund scientific activities or institutions. Throughout the 2000s, however, the frontiers between science and innovation policies have become blurred, due to the increasing relationship between science and wealth creation, the changing nature of relevant science and technology (S&T) fields and the new constraints of public finance that have led to increased co-funding schemes. Such changes have brought new actors into the science and innovation policy field, among them regional governments and agencies, 
MULTI-LEVEL, MULTI-ACTOR SCIENCE GOVERNANCE IN FRANCE

Identifying multi-level governance
The increasing complexity of governance structures can be seen as both a response to the crisis of legitimacy of the State and to greater demands for democracy (KOOIMAN, 1990) .
Authors have emphasised the weakness of the state due to fiscal crisis, decentralisation and administrative reforms and the introduction of new forms of public management as bringing about a wider shift from government to governance (PETERS and PIERRE, 2001) . Problemsolving is no longer seen as necessarily corresponding to one authority or to a specific institutional territory. Instead, governance can refer to institutions and actors drawn from and beyond government; the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues; autonomous self-governing networks of actors; and the capacity for government to use new tools and techniques to steer and guide policy (STOKER 1998) . Such propositions draw attention to the multiplicity of authorities and agencies involved in policy and employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge (DEAN, 1999) .
Multi-level governance appears as a useful tool to capture these processes and describe evolving political systems, referring to the "the dispersion of central government authority both vertically to actors located at other territorial levels, and horizontally, to non state-actors"
(BACHE AND FLINDERS 2004 : 4) . It presupposes that authority is polycentric, shared between multiple actors, territorial levels and with each level disposing of specific resources (CONZELMANN 1998 . BENZ AND EBERLEIN 1999 . Negotiation, non-hierarchical exchanges between levels of government and horizontal relationships at each scale of government are seen to be important features (PETERS AND PIERRE 2001 ). Yet criticisms have focused on its In an attempt to address these concerns, HOOGHE and MARKS (2003) distinguish between two types of multi-level governance: type I and type II where the former is based on federalism and the latter a more variable geometry of organisation. Type I consists of power sharing between a few levels, non-intersecting governments in limited areas and stable authority. Type II is defined by many jurisdictions, which are task specific, intersecting and more flexible. Yet within this typology multi-level governance remains defined as a normative concept rather than an analytical tool. Acknowledging different types of multi-level governance does not necessarily enable the initial identification of a multi-level polity.
What then are the critical tests that indicate the extent and nature of the dispersion of state authority and the identification of multi-level governance? Decentralisation and processes of European integration have created a system of exchanges between different territorial levels such that relations are no longer state-centred. The emergence of relationships between institutions at different levels implies negotiation and dialogue, rather than hierarchical command and control relations. However, while actors, arenas and institutions are not ordered hierarchically, the questions of authority and the asymmetry of power have not totally disappeared. There is no necessary equality between institutions and some actors are more powerful than others. In multi-level governance theories, this is particularly the case in relation to national governments which can exploit new governance structures to increase their steering capacity. Similarly, it has been noted that the role of subnational authorities has been overemphasised in multi-level governance analyses (JORDAN 2001) . What is at stake therefore is the nature of exchanges, distribution and management of resources and the relations between actors within each level of government. Arenas of negotiation and trade-offs, bargaining and potential conflicts between levels all illustrate the F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l y 6 dynamics of multi-level governance in action. In addition, the capacity to take action becomes important as do mechanisms to coordinate public action (PETERS and PIERRE, 2001) . On this basis, three criteria for operationalising multi-governance in any given policy area emerge: 1) the relative roles and responsibilities of territorial actors, with a diluted (albeit dominant) role for the central state 2) the existence and operation of arenas for negotiation and bargaining between national and regional actors in the definition of priorities and allocation of resources and 3) the capacities of different sub-national actors to exploit nationally-created opportunities and / or develop policy from the bottom-up. We shall return to these three tests later.
National and Sectoral Diversity: Science Policy in France
Multi-level governance has not been applied systematically across national settings or policy arenas. Country variables such as national politico-institutional settings, national policy styles and pre-existing institutionalised patterns of centre-periphery relations exert a strong influence on the extent of multi-level governance. (CONZELMANN, 1995 . JOHN 1996 . Some commentators have suggested that multi-level governance is a phenomenon which is structurally restricted to decentralised member states (JEFFREY, 1996, p.201 The debate over multi-level governance in science also takes place in the context of changing research regimes (GIBBONS et al., 1994) and increasing public debates over science (NOWOTNY et al., 2001 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 (SHARP, 1998 . HERAUD, 2003 . This raises key issues relating to the distribution of the scientific and technological expertise on which economic development is predicated and questions over the appropriateness of different scales for action.
The French case is interesting precisely because a decentralised and yet spatially concentrated science policy is anathema to the principles on which the French State is based.
The principle of equality, 'égalité', enshrined since the French revolution, has been traditionally interpreted as necessitating a direct and unmediated relationship between the institutions of the French state and each individual citizen, as well as a commitment to balanced growth and regional symmetry. The concept of multi-level governance in science challenges these principles directly through presupposing multiple sources of authority and a decentralised State, as well as the concentration of scientific resources in particular regions.
Moreover, for a long time, the French system of research and innovation was said to be "colbertist" (CHESNAIS, 1993 infrastructures (POUYET 1998) . In exchange for regional money, the state was forced to concede a role to sub-national authorities as partners in the policy-making process. Cities and The ERA project has specifically driven increased concern with efficiency, competitiveness and international excellence in science. Yet regionalisation has also been an important corollary to European developments and even a stepping stone to international visibility and world-class excellence. For instance, the RTRA programme aims to encourage It has been the subject of some debate as to whether regional authorities could be legitimate partners or even signatories in university's contract planning. This has been resisted on the part of some universities contradicting evidence of a 'regionalisation' of university activities (GROSSETTI and LOSEGO 2003) .
For their part, national research institutes, such as the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), have also started to reform their missions and organization with the aim of joining up education, research and innovation and to improve the relationship with universities in the context of increasing 'hybridisation' (MUSTAR and LAREDO 2002) . Debates in which competition between territories is no longer seen as a zero-sum game, a position supported by the rejection of the notion of 'compensatory solidarity' by the most modern and progressive localities (ibid 109).
A good example of the distinctive French response to equality and competition -or equity -is in the pôles de competitivité. It was originally intended that there would be only 15 clusters selected, chosen on the basis of international excellence and visibility, partnership and the capacity for innovation. This form of operation was clearly seen as a way to apply the European approach of networking centres of excellence and is considered as a pathway towards the implementation of the Lisbon strategy. In planning documents, the initiative was conceived of an important tool of industrial policy, driven by a philosophy of 'variable geometry' (CIADT 2004) . However, a three-tier system of clusters has subsequently emerged 
Arenas for Negotiation and Contestation
As with other European countries, the last two decades have seen an evolution of the French administrative system towards greater devolution. What distinguishes the French experience is the way in which devolution to sub-national public authorities -in terms of the transfer of specific competencies -has been accompanied by the decentralisation of the agencies of the central state.
Since the initial decentralisation laws of 1982, the varied sub-national levels -régions, départements and communes -have emerged as increasingly significant actors mediating the relationship between the state and its citizens. In 2003, legal changes strengthened processes of devolution and enshrined the concept of a 'decentralised organisation for the French Republic' within the constitution. Importantly, regions were made constitutionally equal with The CPER cover all areas of public investments, including science and higher education -to the extent that central and regional authorities have deemed this a priority in different territories. As the regional role in science, research and HE has expanded, as detailed above, so the importance of the CPER as an arena for negotiation in this domain has also increased. Regional authorities, as well as departments and cities in certain cases, have become real partners for science, innovation and higher education policy, negotiating their own priority ranking against the central administration's policy for the territory (BARAIZE 1996) . In the negotiation procedure, regional and national interests are compared, leading to various tradeoffs under the general idea of global co-funding. Generally speaking, there are few problems in reaching agreement for investments in areas where the region is obviously leading. However, the increasing competition between regions in strategic areas such as S&T policy means that the state may be reluctant to co-finance technological or training infrastructures in one region in domains where another region is more advanced. Where disagreements occur, certain projects are 100% financed either by the state or by the region.
Ile-de-France failed to find an agreement with the state on the 'research' part of the CPER and decided to fund a series of projects on its own. Many regions prefer funding education, training and technology transfer than pure research, and are ready to finance a large part of specific projects in those fields. For the current CPER, 83% of scientific investments (excluding facilities) were realised at the end of 2005. This is due to the high priority attached to higher education and research by the state, contrary to other fields like health and social action, for instance, where only 64.75% of investments were realised (DIACT, 2006) . will be a focus on national scale investments and a reinforced and flexible partnership with the collectivities. In this respect, regional authorities are now the 'preferred partners' of the state, with an enhanced role for other authorities. Importantly, the CPER is seen as a vital corollary to the "competitiveness clusters" and necessary for reinforcing research effort and the structure of higher education. Although partners are not equal, the CPER provides an important arena for the contestation and negotiation of top-down and bottom-up priorities in science, research and higher education. Central state actors remain dominant but are increasingly passing responsibility for particular elements down to sub-national authorities, in the context of the move to networks and clusters. The mechanisms of the CPER could be used to further institutionalise this involvement.
To this extent, the evidence examined so far would seem to support the argument that science policy is characterised by multi-level governance dynamics in France. New modes of intervention and changes within the specific policy domain of science and research, as well as reform of institutional mechanisms through the right to experimentation and CPER, have led to intersecting, often task-specific and flexible governance arrangements, indicative of type II multi-level governance (HOOGHE and MARKS 2003) . A supportive framework for the involvement of sub-national authorities in science, research and higher education exists, with appropriate, if unequal, arenas for the negotiation and contestation of priorities. However, there remain considerable differences in the extent to which regional authorities themselves can capitalise upon this context and seize new opportunities to truly develop science-based economic strategies. It is to this final 'test' that we now turn. French science and higher education policy, not all regions are currently in a position to fulfil these functions. Looking first at the data, we see certain differences in regional capacities in relation to science-based economic development. Table 2 A further indicator of regional involvement in science and technology is the proportion of regional budgets devoted to S&T (Table 3) Here the data indicates that regions like Ile-de-France, Languedoc-Roussillon, Auvergne, INSERT TABLE 2 AND TABLE 3 In terms of results, a clear relation between input and output can be discerned from the data (Table 4) Table 4 ) can be used as a potential proxy for indicating systemic coherence of a regional innovation system -here we see again the preeminence of Ile-de-France, but with Midi-Pyrénées and Rhône-Alpes in a strong position.
Regional diversity, local implementation
INSERT TABLE 4 Overall it appears that science-based activities are largely concentrated in only four key areas. Ile-de-France remains the only region to host a full range of elements which can be seen as constituting an innovation system, though this is synonymous with the national system of innovation. Rhône-Alpes can be considered as the sole regional innovation system in France with key strengths in electronics, nuclear industries, life sciences, medicine and materials. Other regions, like PACA and Midi-Pyrénées, exhibit high-tech districts, but they must be considered more as elements of the national innovation system than real endogenous and self-organized systems. PACA provides an interesting example of a region in transition, however, with Sophia-Antipolis, the first science park in Europe, and the emerging Here the tension between regional and local levels becomes particularly apparent: the political acceptability of a regional science policy which leads to concentration of resources in particular locations is low and seen to be contrary to the need for balanced growth. As a result, science and HE policy develops as a local issue, rather than a regional one. Competition can therefore arise between local and regional levels where sub-regional levels want to define their own priorities, rather than participate in a wider regional strategy, which in turn constrains collective action.
The formal expression of regional science and higher education priorities also differs cross-regionally. Four elements are important in understanding the nature of regional action:
the size of the region; the nature of the regional science infrastructure; the type of firms and the structure of the productive fabric; and the specific scientific/technological fields of importance in the region. Socio-political elements have to be taken into account as well, linked to regional identity and cultural attitudes concerning science, academic freedom or the desirability and extent of public-private partnerships. In Alsace, a historical province with a strong collective identity, regional authorities are very proactive in relation to devolution, but this attitude is not specifically blatant in the field of science. At the same time, whilst science is not necessarily a priority for a region, even if they have strong scientific or technological endowments, other policies such as education and training, employment and inclusion may have secondary implications for scientific and research establishments.
These differences are reflected in the use made of formal regional consultative committees on research (CCRRDT) -involving representatives of a large variety of regional actors, in particular from research and industry -with some regions, such as Rhône-Alpes or Midi-Pyrénées, more proactive than others, where a regular regional meeting is organized to debate on science issues at regional level. Since 1982, regional councils are supposed to 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 What emerges from this analysis is a picture of regional differentiation -in terms of the position from which different regions can engage with and capitalise upon the changing national science policy context, as well as develop policies from the bottom up. Yet the data can be misleading -it is not simply the case that a strong science base provides for a coherent regional science policy. Indeed, four rationales for regional science policy in France emerge (see Figure 1 ):
• Regions that have regional science policies because they have a strong science base (Rhône-Alpes is the paradigm);
• Regions with regional science policies because they want to develop their science base (like Bretagne);
• Regions with weak regional science policies and an average or weak science base (like Auvergne);
• Regions with a strong science base yet weak regional science policies (like Alsace).
INSERT FIGURE 1
This last rationale illustrates the situation in most regions. In Alsace, basic research is proportionally strong, with many world-known university and CNRS teams, but the regional 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Regional science strategy is not linked to the presence of scientific activities in a simple and linear way. We have indicated here that several factors explain differences between regions and their interpretations of and responses to changes in national science policy. Further case study research is needed to determine the relative balance of these factors and how they interact to produce distinct regional contexts and capacities for action. The modest conclusions that we can draw at this stage are three-fold. Firstly the available evidence indicates substantial differences in the positions from where regions engage with the emerging multi-level system of science policy governance in France. Secondly, whilst national policy conceives of a role for the regions, there remains little evidence that the phenomenon of regional science policies is well-spread across regions. Thirdly, only four 
A SYSTEM IN EVOLUTION?
To what extent can multi-level governance be said to characterise science policy in
France? The evidence is partial, indicating that the potential for multi-level governance has not been realised in practice. Shifts in science policy governance reflect ongoing processes rather than being fixed in time.
During the last decade, the traditional philosophy of centralised policy design and implementation has changed more in reality than officially advertised. The financial context has encouraged the French state to share certain functions relating to science, research and higher education with local and regional authorities, leading to a more complex governance Within new national frameworks, regions are emerging as intermediate actors within complex governance structures. It is not likely that regional councils can be "the dominant player" but they can mobilise both sub-regional and supra-regional levels to implement their own strategies. Spaces for the negotiation of science policy between national and regional The emerging dynamics of a multi-level science system therefore pose challenges to a traditional centralised French state, with its commitment to balanced growth and regional symmetry. New compromises between concentration and balanced growth have been struck through networking inter-regional groupings and offering equality of opportunity through national competitions. Yet, the principle of territorial equality can no longer be seen as a strict rule in national policy: the success of top-down initiatives (and the corresponding distribution of resources) depends inherently on the willingness and the capacities of the territories.
Within an increasingly regionally-sensitive national framework, it is the capability of actors at the regional level that determines the extent of multi-level governance in different arenas.
From a theoretical perspective, it is this issue that appears most interesting. This analysis has highlighted three prerequisites for the development of a multi-level polity: a national framework that envisages, or even depends on, regional action for the successful implementation of its policies; arenas for negotiation of national and regional 'priorities' and the capacities and capabilities of regional actors to develop clear strategies from the bottomup. In this case, we see that the central Government remains the key actor in science policy.
The state holds the greatest bargaining power and the mobilisation of sub-national authorities Established in 2005 to distribute funding to research projects chosen according to peer-review on the basis of scientific excellence, with a particular emphasis on applied research and collaborations with industry. In 2006 the budget was €800m for research projects over 4 years divided between response mode projects across all disciplines, specific programmes, industry-academic collaboration and non-project funding. Agence de l'Innovation Industrielle -AII (Industrial Innovation Agency)
Established in 2005 with €1.7bn over the first two years to give grants and loans to around 10 industry-led R&D programmes, including biomass exploitation, energy efficiency, a new light rail system, the Franco-German search engine Quaero and a mobile TV project. There is also a focus on small and medium sized enterprises, with the aim of 25% small business participation in the AII programmes. The RTRA, announced in the 2005 Research Bill, are designed to carry out research projects in order to create clusters of internationally excellent science, chosen on through a national competition on the basis of scientific quality, added value and originality. Priority will go to proposals that are cooperative and multidisciplinary, with quality links to economic sectors. The networks will receive substantial funding for new infrastructures and to attract top scientists. A list of 12 regional RTRA (plus one inter-regional in social sciences) has been announced in The PRES are a mechanism for the coordination of research and HE activities within a particular geographic area, to increase efficiency, visibility and the attractiveness of French HE. There is no national competition or limit to numbers of PRES and no initial finance attached.
Carnot Institutes
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